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ABSTRACT
With the emergence of discussion platforms like Twitter, the 
hopes rose that computer-mediated public sphere would become 
more even in access to discussion than mass-mediatized public 
sphere of the late 20th century. Scholars have argued that it will 
eventually form an ‘opinion crossroads’ where conflicts would be 
discussed by all the parties involved. But today, existing research 
provides mixed evidence on whether ordinary users, rather than 
mainstream media and institutional actors, can become 
influencers in discussions on current issues, e.g. relations between 
host and migrant communities. We focus on the Twitter 
discussion about an inter-ethnic conflict in Moscow’s Biryuliovo 
district in 2013 and aim at defining who were its real influencers 
by reconstructing the discussion’s web graph, as well as analyzing 
and juxtaposing its metrics to figures indicating user activity. Our 
results show that, despite hyperactivity of media accounts, they 
were largely absent as deliberative influencers, but the place of 
influencers was occupied by politicized (nationalist and liberal) 
accounts, rather by eyewitness reporters or public figures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public discussions as a tool of formation of public opinion and of 
casting impact upon resolution of social unease have long been 
studied and theorized. By 1990s, it was established that 
mediatized public sphere where traditional media played the role 
of information hubs was highly uneven in terms of access to 
opinion expression; among other features, it was privileging 
institutional players, including political elites and corporations. 
Media themselves became privileged as well, as agenda setting, 
framing of issues and other media effects bringing significant 
distortions and biases to public discussions [1] became a factor in 
public decision making.
With the emergence of Internet, hopes arose that  networked 
communicative spaces would provide better access of citizens to 
public discussions [2], which would equalize them, at least to 
some extent, to the existing institutional opinion leaders selected 
by media who serve as gateways and gatekeepers of public 
agenda [3]. But this optimism soon changed to a more realistic 
(or, rather, pessimistic) view [4], as the growing body of research 
shows that the disparities detected before tend to be reproduced, 
rather than smoothed, in online communicative milieus; 
moreover, new lines of societal cleavages are drawn in hybrid 
media environments [5] due to digital divide, diversification of 
media diets of social groups, and growing fragmentation of 
communication arenas. 
A substantial part of the discussion on democratization of online 
public spheres has been centered around a figure of influencer [6] 
– the platform user with several crucial capacities in information 
dissemination and impact upon other users’ opinions. Influencers 
are viewed as key structural elements of power and impact 
distribution in networked discussions [7; 8; 9] as they may either 
preserve or shift the pre-existing disparities in opinion leadership. 
Due to several platform features like short posting, available API 
data and absence of friend-only modes of publication, Twitter has 
become a major focus of media researchers who checked 
hypotheses relevant to media & public sphere studies with the 
help of social network analysis (SNA). Among these papers, 
detection and prediction of influencers and their discursive nature 
has grown into a major field; more recently, aspects like dynamics
of influencer status and its linkage to user trust [10], discussion 
topicality [11], and nature of the publics [12; 13; 14; 15; 16] have 
gained substantial space. But it is still unclear whether Twitter as 
a communicative platform provides for democratization of the 
influencer status, especially within discussions on social issues 
with high polarization potential.
Twitter studies of influencers may, largely, be clustered in sub-
areas based on understanding of who the influencers are and how 
to detect them. Thus, we may trace a division between two 
understandings of influencers (based on user activity and user 
connectivity), as well as a methodological division between the 
works that measure the power of influencers in absolute figures of 
tweets, followers, retweets, comments and likes, and those using 
network metrics as tools for detection of opinion leaders. But 
practically no attempts have been made to juxtapose these ways 
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forces actively taking part in the discussion, and only the latter 
got followed.
H4, by our results, is formally supported: there are no political 
(institutional or ‘utility’) accounts on top of the discussion. But at 
the same time, half of the top users (as measured by BCPRrating)
were highly politicized and belonged to either nationalist or 
liberal-oppositional camp. The former are the biggest discussion
centers, but the latter form a bigger group of such centers. Thus, 
usual institutional influencers changed to politicized citizens.  
H5 is, again, not fully supported. We expected media to dominate 
all the lists of top users – those marking activity and those 
showing deliberative quality. With great reserve, we can tell that 
they dominate in the number of tweets and, more surely, in the 
number of accounts that retweet or comment them; that is, media 
do perform the role of informers of ‘mass Twitter audience’. But 
only few of them make it to the deliberative centers of the 
discussion. At the same time, both pro- and anti-establishment 
media are present and active, which adds to the ‘crossroads’ 
potential of the discussion.
5. CONCLUSION
What we have found in this paper goes a bit beyond our direct 
hypotheses but clearly reflects our initial notion of two approaches 
to who may be called an influencer on Twitter. 
First, we have spotted two types of influencers in the discussion on 
the Biryuliovo bashings. The first comprised mostly media and 
was clearly ‘marketing’, as it was based on frequent posting (and 
low commenting&retweeting) and getting retweeted a lot. But 
‘political’, or ‘deliberative’, influencers formed circles of 
influential users who inter-linked micro-zones of discussion and 
were cited by the same highly-ranked users. The latter effect 
reminds us of the one discovered in previous research where 
journalists retweeted by other journalists became a circle of 
influencers, but in our case no user linked to an institution was 
actually involved. Our results also adds to the evidence that we 
need to use SNA metrics, not just simple number of retweets, to 
detect real influencers.
Second, we have discovered high politicization of the discussion, 
contrary to expectations; moreover, we have shown that, among 
the top users by centrality metrics, there were two camps 
represented, namely the nationalist camp and the one that may be 
called liberal-critical. It includes users from persons with high level 
of criticism towards the system to oppositional activists, and this 
circle seems to be bigger than the nationalist one. This division, on 
one hand, replicates the overall post-Soviet/cosmopolitan division 
in the Russian media system [90; 91], but on the other hand it 
clearly demonstrates that Twitter has a much bigger ‘crossroads’ 
potential than other media platforms including social networks like 
Facebook. We also cannot help stating that traditional media on 
Twitter do not perform the ‘crossroads’ function, as they have low 
Betweenness centrality and, thus, do not gather users around them. 
But at the same time, on Twitter, unlike in offline world, pro- and 
anti-establishment media have practically equal following and 
exposure, which, in a way, adds to the ‘crossroads’ nature of 
Russian Twitter. At the same time, we have discovered only one 
account openly supporting the position of migrant population; this 
means that the discussion had low deliberative potential in terms of 
representation of the sides of the conflict.
Third, we definitely need more research on why, despite Dmitry 
Medvedev’s account is followed by nearly a half of all the users 
in Russian Twitter and other politicians are active there, too, in 
the case of a resonant inter-ethnic crisis, political and municipal 
accounts had no place in the discussion. Of course the simplest 
explanation would be that local administrations do not tweet; but 
one more explanatory factor may be the traditional low trust to 
institutions in Russia.
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